Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate
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- Create Date：2022-03-16 07:17:32
- Update Date：2025-09-24
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- Author：M.E. Sarotte
- ISBN：030025993X
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Summary
A leading expert on Cold War foreign policy reveals how tensions between America， NATO， and Russia transformed geopolitics in the decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall in a Foreign Affairs Best Book of 2021
Based on over a hundred interviews and on secret records of White House–Kremlin contacts， Not One Inch shows how the United States successfully overcame Russian resistance in the 1990s to expand NATO to more than 900 million people。 But it also reveals how Washington’s hardball tactics transformed the era between the Cold War and the present day， undermining what could have become a lasting partnership。
Vladimir Putin swears that Washington betrayed a promise that NATO would move “not one inch” eastward and justifies renewed confrontation as a necessary response to the alliance’s illegitimate “deployment of military infrastructure to our borders。” But the United States insists that neither President George H。W。 Bush nor any other leader made such a promise。
Pulling back the curtain on U。S。–Russian relations in the critical years between the fall of the Berlin Wall and Putin’s rise to power， prize-winning Cold War historian M。 E。 Sarotte reveals the bitter clashes over NATO behind the facade of friendship and comes to a sobering conclusion: the damage did not have to happen。 In this deeply researched and compellingly written book， Sarotte shows what went wrong。
Based on over a hundred interviews and on secret records of White House–Kremlin contacts， Not One Inch shows how the United States successfully overcame Russian resistance in the 1990s to expand NATO to more than 900 million people。 But it also reveals how Washington’s hardball tactics transformed the era between the Cold War and the present day， undermining what could have become a lasting partnership。
Vladimir Putin swears that Washington betrayed a promise that NATO would move “not one inch” eastward and justifies renewed confrontation as a necessary response to the alliance’s illegitimate “deployment of military infrastructure to our borders。” But the United States insists that neither President George H。W。 Bush nor any other leader made such a promise。
Pulling back the curtain on U。S。–Russian relations in the critical years between the fall of the Berlin Wall and Putin’s rise to power， prize-winning Cold War historian M。 E。 Sarotte reveals the bitter clashes over NATO behind the facade of friendship and comes to a sobering conclusion: the damage did not have to happen。 In this deeply researched and compellingly written book， Sarotte shows what went wrong。
Reviews
Liquidlasagna
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Foreign AffairsA distinguished historian of transatlantic relations revisits Western relations with Russia during the 1990s。 This critical decade set the tone for geopolitics in the post–Cold War period， above all though the expansion of NATO。Sarotte weaves together the most engaging and carefully documented account of this period in East-West diplomacy currently available。 She deepens the conventional wisdom among most historians， namely that in the late 1980s and early 1990s， many Western lead Foreign AffairsA distinguished historian of transatlantic relations revisits Western relations with Russia during the 1990s。 This critical decade set the tone for geopolitics in the post–Cold War period， above all though the expansion of NATO。Sarotte weaves together the most engaging and carefully documented account of this period in East-West diplomacy currently available。 She deepens the conventional wisdom among most historians， namely that in the late 1980s and early 1990s， many Western leaders gave informal assurances that NATO would not expand—not just to the territory of the former East Germany but also across central and eastern Europe。 Since Moscow failed to secure any formal guarantee， however， Western leaders later went ahead anyway， downplaying or denying any contradiction。She argues more speculatively that this perceived betrayal was a major factor in the subsequent collapse of democracy in Russia and the further deterioration of relations between the West and Russia under President Vladimir Putin。But most of the book’s evidence actually leans in the opposite direction and suggests that U。S。 Presidents George H。 W。 Bush and Bill Clinton and their top diplomats slowed NATO expansion to try to stabilize the government of Russian President Boris Yeltsin in the short term and held off as long as he still looked viable。 It was only when Yeltsin’s fall became imminent， and a hardening of East-West relations started to seem inevitable， that the United States moved to expand the alliance。 。。。more
Reid Champagne
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The light that was an oncoming train The current war in Ukraine might have its roots in the post-Cold War expansion of Nato， creating what could look like a tightening vice grip to an increasingly autocratic Russia， continuing on a desperate path to restore its former empire。 Bad enough that admitting Poland created the first contiguous Nato border with Russia， then admitting the Baltic States plunging Nato military hardware on land once annexed by the former USSR。 An independent and westward lo The light that was an oncoming train The current war in Ukraine might have its roots in the post-Cold War expansion of Nato， creating what could look like a tightening vice grip to an increasingly autocratic Russia， continuing on a desperate path to restore its former empire。 Bad enough that admitting Poland created the first contiguous Nato border with Russia， then admitting the Baltic States plunging Nato military hardware on land once annexed by the former USSR。 An independent and westward looking Ukraine would appear as an even deeper thrust into what had once been part of the Russian Empire。 （Imagine Mexico suddenly reclaiming Texas。） It does seem to have unfolded that the U。S。 push for Nato enlargement created an unbalance of strength leading one side into a false sense of security， while the other falls into fear， mistrust and ultimately paranoia， especially when seen through the beady eyes of a true sociopath。 As the great philosopher Pogo said， "We has met the enemy， and he is us。" 。。。more
Ramiro Breitbach
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Very well researched book on a hot topic 。 Learned a lot about the security negotioations following the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the USSR
Oleg Marynchak
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Well written but sometimes a bit 'heavy': too much minutiae on trivial matters （like dialogs between leaders）。 The irony of situation is that I've just finished it now， sitting in a bomb shelter near Kyiv。 After Putin's speech on Ukraine， its absolutely clear， that in XXI century despotic countries feel threat not only from military infrastructure， but pretty much threat by cultural-ideological influence of neighbouring countries。 Well written but sometimes a bit 'heavy': too much minutiae on trivial matters （like dialogs between leaders）。 The irony of situation is that I've just finished it now， sitting in a bomb shelter near Kyiv。 After Putin's speech on Ukraine， its absolutely clear， that in XXI century despotic countries feel threat not only from military infrastructure， but pretty much threat by cultural-ideological influence of neighbouring countries。 。。。more
Mary
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Brilliant。 Must read to understand the deterioration of post-Soviet Russia/US relations。
James
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Not One Inch is indispensable reading for observers of and participants in contemporary global political decision making。 Dr。 Sarotte provides knowledgeable， thoughtful， well documented insights into the US/Russia/European clash over NATO expansion in Europe and Ukraine's tilt towards the West， a long simmering problem that has recently leapt to the forefront of the daily news cycle。 For Westerners who understand Sun Tzu's admonition to "know the enemy，" the time and （minimal） effort required to Not One Inch is indispensable reading for observers of and participants in contemporary global political decision making。 Dr。 Sarotte provides knowledgeable， thoughtful， well documented insights into the US/Russia/European clash over NATO expansion in Europe and Ukraine's tilt towards the West， a long simmering problem that has recently leapt to the forefront of the daily news cycle。 For Westerners who understand Sun Tzu's admonition to "know the enemy，" the time and （minimal） effort required to read Dr。 Sarotte's book will be time well spent。 Dr。 Sarotte systematically presents the history and the facts underlying Russia's - especially President Putin's - behavior， separating the chaff of personal interpretation and vested interests from the substantive events and actions。 We often hear the term "fog of war，" but in truth diplomacy suffers no less from fog。 In a hundred years， when people look back on the events we are observing today in Eastern Europe and those people seek the root causes of today's crisis， Not One Inch will form the foundation on which they build their research as Dr。 Sarotte illuminates both the fog and the misunderstandings and the miscalculations it has caused。 。。。more
Elena Calistru
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Deși nu sunt în acord cu unele dintre concluzii （pentru că sunt dureroase pentru cineva din Europa Centrală și de Est）， e o carte senzațională。 Foarte bine documentată， scrisă atât de bine încât abia aștepți să vezi ce se mai întâmplă （sau ce era în spatele unor timpuri trăite）。 O recomand din toată inima （și mai ales din tot creierul） celor care vor să înțeleagă istoria NATO， dinamica post-Război Rece și poate și sursa tensiunilor de acum din Ucraina。
Peter Podbielski
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In the meticulously researched history， Not One Inch， M。E。 Sarotte details the backstory of U。S。–Russian relations in the critical years between the fall of the Berlin Wall and Putin’s rise to power。 Sarotte describes the clashes over German unification， NATO enlargement， Ukraine， arms control， and the post-Cold War security order that underscore several points of contention between the U。S。 and Russia。 While the United States successfully safeguarded its strategic interest - keeping NATO viable In the meticulously researched history， Not One Inch， M。E。 Sarotte details the backstory of U。S。–Russian relations in the critical years between the fall of the Berlin Wall and Putin’s rise to power。 Sarotte describes the clashes over German unification， NATO enlargement， Ukraine， arms control， and the post-Cold War security order that underscore several points of contention between the U。S。 and Russia。 While the United States successfully safeguarded its strategic interest - keeping NATO viable – Russia， weakened after the dissolution of the Soviet Union， felt compelled to accede to the undesired political changes。 The new political realities fermented resentments that escalated in 2008 with Russia’s conflict with Georgia and Ukraine in 2014。In addition to a valuable historical reference， Not One Inch stands as a primer for how nations identify and pursue national interests。 To answer， “How can an understanding of these events guide efforts to create a better future？” Sarotte offers three principles:1。 The necessity of renewed competition from Moscow provides a unifying mission that can help bridge fractures within the United States。2。 Washington should address Russian challenges by aggressively and unashamedly prioritizing transatlantic cooperation。 One issue requiring transatlantic focus is Ukraine， a country crucial to European stability。3。 Understanding history can help us， if not to predict， then certainly prepare for the future。Sarotte reminds us that both the United States and Russia undermined the opportunity for a lasting and enduring partnership。 。。。more
Chris Esposo
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Reading this book in January 2022， is somewhat surreal， but timely。 Also， having been a “news and military history” junkie as a child throughout the 90s when many of the events written about in this text were occurring makes it extra surreal as I even recall reading and thinking about these events as they occurred， so there’s an added element of （strange） nostalgia。 On its own merits however， M。E Sarotte’s book is a well-written sequence-history of the geopolitical events that led to the current Reading this book in January 2022， is somewhat surreal， but timely。 Also， having been a “news and military history” junkie as a child throughout the 90s when many of the events written about in this text were occurring makes it extra surreal as I even recall reading and thinking about these events as they occurred， so there’s an added element of （strange） nostalgia。 On its own merits however， M。E Sarotte’s book is a well-written sequence-history of the geopolitical events that led to the current security environment in eastern Europe （or Russia’s ‘near-abroad’） starting from the last few years of the Cold War to the last year of the 1990s。 As a reference， it may be better than good， but excellent， with well over a hundred pages of citations， and bibliography。 I anticipate many hours of primary source reading yielded from this book。 However， as a piece of synthesis， the book is more wanting， with the synthesis not occurring till literally the last 40 mins of audio （out of a 15 hour and 54 mins book）， and it was definitely rushed or massaged to fit current messaging （likely by editors to ensure it would maximize sales given current events）。 After 15+ hours （500+ pages） of text with the author basically outlining how the multiple ways the H。W Bush administration， then the Clinton administration， “dunned” the Yeltsin administration of Russia’s nascent democracy， for political capital， to hurriedly acquiesce to various NATO enlargement schemes， the author’s only conclusion was effectively “we could have done better， though had we have to do it again， we’d more or less do the same thing， but w/ more panache。 Further， now that we are in conflict with Russia， we can't be critical of NATO （which I was sort of doing for 90% of this book）”。 There’s no real latitude of vision on whether it even made sense for the post-Cold War framework to be primarily driven by NATO， and not by something altogether different， like a novel European security framework， which was actively being discussed by policy makers at the time， including the famed Cold-War architect George Kennan （who’s apprehension to NATO enlargement was quoted several times by Sarotte）。 tSarotte’s basic conclusion assumes NATO is fixed， and given the desire of nations like Poland to join， concludes that nothing much （substantive） could have been done to change the eventuality of expansion， and more importantly of "Article 5" expansion， or the "full rights"。 The few “changes” mentioned include changing the name of NATO into something else though not changing the organization at all （a strange request from Yeltsin’s foreign minister）， and having more discussion on the nature of “Article 5” expansion beyond Germany。 Banal。 Though to be fair to the author， the normative question of what could have replaced NATO， or how might the European Economic Community （EEC/EC， the precursor to the EU） might have evolved to expand into a common continental/regional security scope is both counterfactual and possible beyond the domain of a historian， and firmly within the domain of international relations/political science/social science。tAgain， this element of the text is literally less than 10% of the content， so it’s weakness doesn’t weigh the whole text down too much， which is otherwise a good detailed-filled history on this topic。 The book nicely spans not only the internal dialogue/rationale of the three US administrations / two presidents （Bush-88/Clinton-92/Clinton-96） very well， but also provides good context on the internal logic of some of the European leaders， most prominently Helmut Kohl， but also including some input from the various French administrations， including Mitterand/Chirac as well as the relevant British administrations to name a few。 tWhat becomes clear quickly as one reads this is that Yeltsin was not prepared to deal w/ the Western nations soundly。 This was either because of the momentous change that Russia had recently undergone， both in internal economy and governance， or the personal failing of Yeltsin， most notably his ill-controlled alcoholism （or both）， which features prominently in the narrative here。 Yeltsin’s strategy seems to have been to provide as much cooperation as possible to both the Bush and Clinton administrations， first in the realm of strategic arms-controls， then WMD-cleanup/consolidation， and finally in conventional-arms reduction in Europe， in hopes this will incentivize Western capital to flow into the country。 The Western nations likewise were incentivized to make Yeltsin’s transition and leadership as smooth as possible， mostly because they feared what would happen once/if he was removed/left/retired from power， and to buy time to expand NATO as far east as possible。 tThe author paints this later objective mostly as benign， though vaguely so。 There’s a key quote from Clinton， who’s opinion was basically that NATO should expand maximally east eventually， and that it would provide Russia w/ a sort of fait-accompli， and incentivize it to cooperate， and revert to a more docile form （it should noted that this was the time of maximum Russian cooperation via Yeltsin）。 It is also the case that many of these former Warsaw Pact nations had understandable concerns and more importantly， understandable economic incentives to join the alliance， especially as “consumers” of security （if not “producers” of it）， thus allowing them to reallocate capital generated within their nations to more productive use outside of security。 tI thought that reading this book would make me feel more informed， and thus better equipped to understand the current situation， and more confident in it’s ultimate resolution， but it does not。 In fact， it all seems even bleaker now。 Although we were able to achieve substantive cooperation during the Yeltsin era， it was not lasting， and most importantly， the national security apparatus of Russia learned to trust the US and some European nations less。 This occurred under a mostly passive and benign Russian leader。 But it’s also unclear what control US policy makers do have over the multifarious interests that represent US “interests” （much less broader “Western” ones）。 Several times both， Bush and Clinton administrations had principals who saw that they needed to change course， or to “come to terms” with the Russians， that would be acceptable to all parties with respect to a security compact for Europe。 Yet， in each case， those principals were confounded by the chaotic realities of internal domestic politics as well as the chaos of internal fighting within the respective administrations。 Even when such an arraignment was made， the so-called “Partnership for Peace” （PfP）， the author reveals that the architects of this architecture always planned it for being a “holding pen” to retard the progress of certain nations， which was exclusively Russia at the time， from ever ascending to NATO membership， yet provide some minimal operational alignment and the outer-veneer of partnership。 In effect， it was at least partially a subterfuge， and not genuine。 Either way， this is a good read， and will likely be authoritative on this topic going forward。 Recommended。 。。。more
Eric
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As someone who is apolitical， I thought the book was fairly good throughout， even despite the author’s political biases being clear （i。e， her unrelated tangents disparaging the George H。 W。 Bush Administration and defending the Clintons）。 I was able to look past that。 However， her conclusion unabashedly blames the two Republican presidents in the 21st century for the downward spiral in American-Russian relations and not the Democratic presidents。 Republicans AND Democrats contributed to deterior As someone who is apolitical， I thought the book was fairly good throughout， even despite the author’s political biases being clear （i。e， her unrelated tangents disparaging the George H。 W。 Bush Administration and defending the Clintons）。 I was able to look past that。 However， her conclusion unabashedly blames the two Republican presidents in the 21st century for the downward spiral in American-Russian relations and not the Democratic presidents。 Republicans AND Democrats contributed to deteriorating relations with Russia since 2001 （after all， I lived through it and remember it！）。 On top of that， she peddles Washington Post and New York Times articles as solid fact-filled sources that， in reality， were political hit-pieces filled with conspiracy theories which have since been debunked。 Reading her conclusion chapter with such highly partisan rhetoric made me dismiss almost everything she wrote throughout the book。 It’s a shame the author could not tell history as history， nor refrain from inserting her highly political biases into what could have been a great historical account of the ten years following the fall of the Berlin Wall。 。。。more
Eileen Seitz
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